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MARC – Mergers & Acquisitions Research Centre 
MARC is the Mergers and Acquisitions Research Centre at Cass Business School, City 
University London – the first research centre at a major business school to pursue focussed 
leading-edge research into the global mergers and acquisitions industry. 
MARC blends the expertise of M&A accountants, bankers, lawyers, consultants and other key 
market participants with the academic excellence of Cass to provide fresh insights into the 
world of deal-making. 
Corporations, regulators, professional services firms, exchanges and universities use MARC 
for swift access to research and practical ideas. From deal origination to closing, from financing 
to integration, from the hottest emerging markets to the board rooms of the biggest 
corporations, MARC researches the wide spectrum of mergers, acquisitions and corporate 
restructurings. 
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Overview
&A can be motivated by many 
different things and it is not 
unnatural to believe that these 
motivations could be dependent on where we 
are in the M&A cycle. By extension if we believe 
that different motivations lead to different 
‘success’ rates then there could be different 
success rates at different points in the cycle. 
This is the topic of this report. 
First movers have historically been feted for 
their strategic motivations in pursuing M&A and 
the advantages gained from moving early, such 
as the availability of attractive targets. In 
contrast, late followers have been 
characterised as firms that exemplify irrational 
behaviour as they are compelled by competitive 
pressures to mimic the actions of their rivals 
without a logical rationale for the motivations 
underlying the M&A announcement.  
We set out to test this simplistic view and in this 
report we tested the difference in performance 
between first movers and late followers using a 
sample of global M&A deals for two periods, 
Wave 1 (1990-2002) and Wave 2 (2003-2009).  
We found considerable evidence that this 
simplistic view may not be correct, with our so 
called ‘late followers’ at least as successful as 
the ‘first movers’. 
Before we highlight some relevant practical 
findings for practitioners we will also show that 
there may be something different about the 
latest M&A wave. There are certain features of 
this second wave (notably the prevalence of 
cross-border M&A) that may make first mover 
advantage less prevalent. In addition, insight 
from literature in other fields may be casting 
those first movers in a less unreservedly 
flattering light, which should give managements 
pause in their attempts to be the first to acquire.  
We conclude: 
 It’s not too late 
If you find a compelling M&A opportunity but 
you feel others have invested in that area 
already, it’s not necessarily a bad thing.  
 Something’s changed in the latest wave 
The M&A market is becoming more about 
new geographies and opportunities, deals 
where the more you know before you 
proceed, the better.  
 M&A can and does add value 
Unavoidably, we looked at the data and saw 
a generally positive reaction to acquisitions, 
regardless of which end of the ‘wave’ we are 
at.  
And perhaps, judging by the positive reception 
given by the market to both our first movers and 
late followers, we must conclude that you don’t 
want to be caught in the middle. 
In M&A, unlike nature, the early bird may not 
always get the worm! 
Figure 1: M&A deals announced 1990-2014 (Source: ThomsonONE)
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A history of M&A waves
n 1993, Golbe and White1 first formalised the 
tendency of M&A activity to occur in ‘waves’. 
M&A rarely occurs in isolation, a low level of 
activity is often followed by a surge in M&A 
volume before subsiding again to lower levels 
of activity. This wave pattern suggests 
interdependent and competitive behaviour as 
firms compete to merge and acquire one 
another. 
The accepted view is that industry shocks 
instigate merger waves, where collective 
reaction is such that assets are reallocated and 
reorganised through M&A. Behavioural 
hypotheses attribute it to overvaluation and 
periods of high stock returns, which spurs those 
with highly valued stocks to acquire assets of 
undervalued targets. Ultimately, both 
explanations attribute waves to the state of, and 
changes in, the macroeconomic environment, 
which induces firms to engage in M&A.  
The authors mentioned above identified four 
waves that occurred principally in the U.S., to 
which can be added two global waves that have 
followed. As already mentioned periods begin 
with low levels of M&A activity, which sharply 
increase before reaching a peak, followed by a 
fall. 
Most literature contended that first movers lead 
in an M&A wave, whilst late followers are 
compelled by competitive pressures to react to 
the moves of competitors. The veracity of this 
view is the focus of the rest of this report. 
 
Figure 2: The six waves of M&A (York University) 
Waves Period Dominant characterisation
First 
Wave 
1893 – 
1904 
Horizontal mergers, creation of the principal steel, telephone, oil and 
manufacturing giants of the U.S. 
Second 
Wave 
1919 – 
1929 
Vertical mergers. Consolidation along the value chain. Rise of auto 
manufacturers. 
Third 
Wave 
1955 – 
1970 
Diversified conglomerate mergers. Expansion and diversification into once 
non-core products. 
Fourth 
Wave 
1974 – 
1989 Hostile takeovers, corporate raiders and highly leveraged transactions. 
Fifth 
Wave 
1993 – 
2000 
Mega mergers: TMT and in oil, banks, autos, etc… Belief in size as an 
absolute virtue. Massive value destruction in some deals, e.g; AOL-Time 
Warner. 
Sixth 
Wave 
2003 – 
2008 Globalisation, private equity, shareholder activism led by hedge funds 
 
                                                            
1 Golbe, D. and White, L. Review of Economics and Statistics, 
1993 
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The accepted view - First mover 
advantage 
n 2004, Carow et al 2  suggested that first 
movers lead in an M&A wave by pursuing 
intentional and strategic M&A. They develop 
first-mover advantage by moving early: they 
have access to a wider pool of targets and 
hence are more likely to acquire targets with a 
higher potential for high returns. This explains 
prominent empirical studies conducted by 
authors such as Haleblian3 that demonstrated 
first movers perform better than late followers.  
As an example, exploring a sample of 
completed acquisitions involving public-traded 
U.S. companies between 1979 and 1998, 
Carow found that combined announcement 
returns during the event window (-1, +1) were 
1.24% higher for acquisitions at the beginning 
of the industry merger wave, supporting the 
belief that first-mover M&A transactions 
experience larger announcement returns. 
Furthermore, in the same piece ‘strategic 
pioneers’ were found to outperform the 
remaining acquirers within an M&A wave. 
And follower disadvantage 
Conversely, this theory would suggest that late 
followers are inclined to take action only when 
significant competitive tension is encountered. 
Based on a sample of 1,316 companies in the 
U.S. software industry, another study4 reported 
a significant negative direct effect of intra-
segment acquisitions on firm performance. This 
supported their hypothesis that acquisitions 
undertaken as a response to competitive 
pressures are negatively related to firm 
performance.  
The logic would be as follows. As first movers 
pre-empt the best targets, high potential targets 
become scarce which renders them to be in 
greater demand. This demand causes the price 
to acquire them to increase, which prevents late 
followers from capturing the full benefits of their 
                                                            
2 Carow et al, Strategic Management Journal, 2004 
3 Haleblian et al, Strategic Management Journal, 2012 
acquisition. Whilst first movers’ acquisitions are 
backed by strategic intent, later acquisitions 
may occur simply as a mimic of earlier 
acquirers, conducted without an understanding 
of the underlying rationale of their competitor’s 
M&A action. Hence, in comparing the 
underlying motivation of first movers and late 
followers, the former is intentional and strategic 
whilst the latter often occurs at random in 
response to competitive pressure. 
Academic research limitations 
As an aside we would highlight the fact that the 
literature on this topic makes use of the widely 
used academic technique by which the efficient 
market hypotheses assumes that the ‘success’ 
of any transaction can be determined by looking 
at short term movements in the acquirer share 
price, rather than longer term studies (whether 
of a stock price or operating metrics). One of 
the obvious counterpoints to this assumption is 
the prevalence of merger arbitrage funds who, 
regardless of their view of an acquisition’s 
‘quality’, will buy the target and short the 
acquirer, in a stock for stock deal. We try to 
compensate for this by looking at multiple 
performance periods but it is an inexact 
science. 
Note also that these studies do not incorporate 
the latest merger wave as their longer term 
performance periods are not available. 
However, the arguments aren’t all on one side. 
Competitive dynamics literature contends that 
following the actions of competitors is a 
legitimate and rational defence strategy to 
protect one’s relative competitive position. Late 
followers can hence be distinguished between 
those who have irrational motivations and 
those, like first movers, who are strategically 
motivated. In the former, first movers would 
perform better than late followers. The latter 
4 Keil, T and Laamanen, T, HBR, 2011 
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proposes an alternate situation where late 
followers actually perform better than first 
movers. 
Stepping outside M&A 
The notion of late followers’ advantage is 
prominent in the area of product innovation, 
where the research explores advantages 
derived from moving last and how this is 
exploited when a strategic approach is adopted. 
One 5  analysis of drug launches in the 
pharmaceutical industry revealed first mover 
advantage remained prominent, accounting for 
10% of the market share in 2000-2012. 
However, their study revealed more than 40% 
of winners in the drug launches were late 
entrants. This study is limited to the activity of 
product launches. However, the results suggest 
a trend favouring the performance of late 
followers, which may provide insight into their 
parallel performance in the M&A field. Strategic 
imitators don’t simply copy but are capable of 
developing a better version of an idea. This was 
highlighted in a study that discovered imitators 
captured approximately 98% of value 
generated from innovations. By moving last, 
late followers derive the advantage of being 
able to observe the successes and failures of 
the actions of first movers and therefore 
formulate an optimal strategy accordingly. 
Therefore, late followers may be strategically 
motivated and hence perform better than first 
movers6. 
Behavioural change was recognised in another 
study7 which proposed that late followers have 
strategic motives and capabilities to innovate 
beyond simply replicating the actions of 
competitors. Note that their study was based on 
emerging markets, something that may hint as 
to one explanation for the performance change 
we observed. 
Clearly there will be intentional differences in 
the timing of participation in an M&A wave and 
also the underlying motivations between first 
movers and late followers. These are unlikely to 
be static over time and hence worthy of update 
post each new merger wave, as we shall see. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                            
5 Cha, M. and Yu, F. McKinsey, 2015 
6 Yang, M. and Hyland, M. Journal of Management, 2006 
7 Li, J. and Kozhidoke, K. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 
2008 
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Our findings 
ur analysis was based on a 
database of 1,496 global M&A deals 
between the periods 1990-2009, 
where two wave periods were identified, Wave 
1 (1990-2002) and Wave 2 (2002-2009). Note 
the latter wave was not covered by the 
published research summarised in the previous 
section of this report, and thus our study does 
provide up-to-date and more relevant analysis 
based on the most recent data. 
We took the first 25 movers and the 25 last for 
both waves one and two, giving a total group of 
100 M&A deals. We then looked at returns 
versus the stock market over varying event 
periods around the M&A announcement.  
Below we show the average cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR) by stock over each 
period. 
In the data for Wave 1, 1990-2002, we see that 
the first movers outperformed the market to a 
 
statistically significant level, on all four event 
study periods. The late followers didn’t 
generally do so well but did deals that were still 
well received, particularly if we measure using 
the two shortest event intervals. Looking at the 
data for Wave 2 we see quite a different pattern. 
We see outperformance by the late followers 
that is statistically significant, while the first 
movers’ performance was mixed (and 
statistically speaking) not significant. 
In Wave 1 there is some suggestion of first 
mover outperformance of late followers and 
interestingly no suggestion of 
underperformance versus the market in any 
period.  
In Wave 2 something does seem to have 
changed versus Wave 1 and compared to the 
existing accepted literature around M&A first 
mover advantage, literature that does not 
include the latest wave. So what has changed? 
And why? 
 
 Figure 3: Performance relative to the market in days around deal announcement in Wave 1
 
Figure 4: Performance relative to the market in days around deal announcement in Wave 2 
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What could have changed? 
oes what we are seeing indicate a 
shift in late followers’ underlying 
motivation in pursuing M&A towards 
a more strategic rather than irrational, copy-cat 
approach?  
Or is this M&A wave intrinsically 
different?  
If we look in more detail at the fifth and sixth 
global M&A waves mentioned above (which 
correspond in time nicely to our studies Wave 1 
and Wave 2) there are some characteristics of 
each that may hint at a reason for the improving 
relative performance of late followers that we 
have observed. 
In the fifth wave there seemed to be a belief in 
size as an absolute virtue, with deals within the 
oil, technology and auto sectors in particular. 
With these types of deal the best targets are 
likely to go first. And moving ‘last’ may well be 
a ‘me-too’ step, with a less attractive partner, or, 
even worse, just undertaking the acquisition to 
make yourself too big to be acquired. 
Turning to the latest, sixth, wave 
The first obvious defining characteristic of the 
latest wave is the prominence of cross border 
activity. As the figure below shows cross border 
M&A, as a percentage of the total, reached 41% 
in 2007, versus just 23% as recently as 2000. 
These deals are typically about gaining access 
to new markets. This is not about innovation 
and indeed, it is often best not to be the first to 
enter a new geography, but to learn from those 
that came before. There is very rarely only one 
way into a country.   
In addition, the rise of private equity has given 
corporates more competition for those early 
mover, counter cyclical, deep value acquisitions 
that often presage the start of an M&A wave. 
And lastly, the lowering of deal premiums 
observed in this wave suggests a less ‘frenzied’ 
market with less of a late cycle rush. 
So taken together there is some evidence that 
on a macro scale this recent M&A wave may be 
different and hence on a micro scale the 
behaviours and motivations of participants 
themselves are different. This offers a possible 
explanation for our results.
 
Figure 5: Cross border flows (Source: Dealogic, McKinsey) 
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What it means for M&A practitioners 
hese findings support the theory of 
competitive dynamics, where, 
contrary to criticisms of mimicking 
behaviour, attempts to match the moves of 
competitors are regarded as a viable defence 
strategy. Late followers achieving higher 
returns than first movers may be explained by 
the timing advantage of their participation. By 
moving later, late followers have an ability to 
observe the performance and the outcome of 
M&A decisions of first movers. In light of the 
successes and failures of first movers, late 
followers are able to reassess their own M&A 
decisions and strategy to proceed accordingly. 
M&A practitioners can also learn from outside 
their own field, observing the late movers’ 
advantage which has been prominent in studies 
outside of M&A literature, such as those 
mentioned above about new product launches, 
who revealed late entrants or imitators were 
able to generate more value than first movers. 
Taken together with the changing nature of 
M&A waves we suggest first mover advantage 
is no longer a given. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In practical terms: 
 It’s not too late 
If you find a compelling M&A opportunity but 
you feel others invested in that area have 
already taken advantage of the situation, 
learn from their mistakes. At the same time 
you may benefit from waning valuations at 
the end of the ‘wave’. 
 Something’s changed in the last wave 
As the prevalence of mega mergers 
potentially recedes, whether due to their 
historic lack of success, increasing anti-trust 
regulation or simply a lack of opportunity, the 
M&A market is becoming more about new 
geographies and opportunities. While deals 
such as this may appear riskier, they are 
also deals where the more you know before 
you proceed, the better. Wait before you 
jump. 
 M&A is a valuable tool 
While this report has focussed on the 
specific subject of M&A timing within 
‘waves’, it is unavoidable to also look at the 
data and see the generally positive reaction 
to acquisitions regardless of which end of 
the ‘wave’ we are at. As such this data adds 
to the growing weight of literature that has 
moved beyond the simplistic ‘M&A destroys 
value’ assumption, an assumption that is 
now being challenged when studies are 
refined by considering such areas as serial 
acquirers, private acquisitions and the value 
of the ‘bolt-on’ versus the mega-merger.
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Data and Methodology: 
An event study and univariate analysis involving a two-group mean comparison test was performed. These 
methods were performed on a sample of 1,496 global M&A deals between the periods 1990-2009, where two 
wave periods were identified. 
To obtain the sample of M&A deals, data was primarily sourced from the Thomson Reuters Securities Data 
Company (SDC) Platinum Database, a widely used database for M&A studies. To obtain financial information, 
such as company daily share prices and index level data, the Datastream database was utilized. 
To further narrow the sample, the deal value criteria was included only those deals above USD$500m. Consistent 
with past studies, deals with acquiring firms from the financial services industry were excluded due to their distinct 
asset structure compared to other industries.  
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